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Note 
 
Reclaiming Reclamation: Rule Changes Proposed 
To Ensure Coal Companies Fund Mandatory 
Clean-Ups 
Taylor Mayhall∗ 
When I was a child my family would travel 
Down to Western Kentucky where my parents were born 
And there’s a backwards old town that’s often remembered 
So many times that my memories are worn.1 
These nostalgic lyrics by folk singer John Prine may not seem 
likely candidates to become the anthem of a social activist move-
ment. Yet this 1971 song, entitled “Paradise,”2 made famous the 
large-scale impacts of strip mining, a form of surface mining that 
removes seams of coal by digging out huge open pits.3 
And daddy won’t you take me back to Muhlenberg County 
Down by the Green River where Paradise4 lay 
Well, I’m sorry my son, but you’re too late in asking 
Mister Peabody’s coal train has hauled it away5 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2018, University of Minnesota Law School. Thank you 
to everyone who provided ideas and feedback throughout the writing process, 
especially Professor Bradley Karkkainen, Professor Alexandra Klass, Mr. Greg-
ory Conrad, and Minnesota Law Review editors and staff. Copyright © 2018 by 
Taylor Mayhall.  
 1. John Prine Lyrics, AZLYRICS, http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/johnprine/ 
paradise.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). 
 2. This song was later covered by numerous prominent artists including 
Johnny Cash, John Fogerty, and Jimmy Buffett. See Artists Covering John 
Prine Songs, JP SHRINE, http://www.jpshrine.org/lyrics/prineapps2.htm (last 
updated Oct. 4, 2017); see also Paradise, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Paradise_(John_Prine_song) (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). 
 3. William Andrew Hustrulid, Strip Mining, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTAN-
ICA, https://www.britannica.com/technology/strip-mining (last visited Jan. 31, 
2018). 
 4. While Paradise figuratively refers to a pristine, heavenly place, it liter-
ally refers to a town in Kentucky. See Jack Doyle, Paradise, 1971: John Prine, 
POP HISTORY DIG (May 28, 2014), http://www.pophistorydig.com/topics/para-
dise1971-john-prine. 
 5. John Prine Lyrics, supra note 1. 
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Prine wrote this song for his father, as a tribute to family trips 
to Kentucky when he was a child.6 After the song’s debut, envi-
ronmentalists latched on to it as illustrative of why tougher min-
ing regulations were needed.7 
Then the coal company came with the world’s largest shovel8 
And they tortured the timber and stripped all the land 
Well, they dug for their coal till the land was forsaken 
Then they wrote it all down as the progress of man.9 
By touting this song and pushing hard at Congress and state 
politicians, environmentalists eventually achieved their goal.10 
Congress passed the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation 
Act (SMCRA) in 1977,11 with a provision that requires coal min-
ing companies to pay to “reclaim” the areas that have been 
mined.12 In other words, Congress makes coal mining companies 
fund efforts that will someday restore mined areas to a natural 
state. Until recently, many companies have taken advantage of 
a provision in the law that allows them to, in effect, insure them-
 
 6. About, JOHN PRINE, http://www.johnprine.com/about (last visited Jan. 
31, 2018). 
 7. E.g., Doyle, supra note 4 (“Prine’s song became one of the popular ex-
pressions of that struggle [to get strip mine regulations], helping to bring the 
issue to a broader audience, and was also used to rally supporters.”). Environ-
mentalists have continued to use the song as a weapon against Peabody. See 
Ben Neary, Peabody Energy Still Chafes at Strip-Mining Protest Song, WASH. 
TIMES (July 6, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/6/ 
peabody-energy-still-chafes-at-strip-mining-protes (describing recent use of the 
song to rankle Peabody in a federal lawsuit brought by environmentalists re-
garding a pension-related protest at a Peabody shareholder meeting). 
 8. For more information about the “world’s largest shovel,” named Big 
Hog, see James Bruggers, Bankrupt Peabody Had “World’s Largest Shovel,” 
COURIER J. (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.courier-journal.com/story/tech/science/ 
watchdog-earth/2016/04/13/peabody-bankruptcy-remembering-big-hog/ 
82980882. 
 9. John Prine Lyrics, supra note 1. 
 10. See Doyle, supra note 4. 
 11. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 
(2012). 
 12. See generally, Regulation of Surface Mining Operations: Hearings on S. 
425 and S. 923 Before the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 
(1973) (including testimony before the Senate Committees expressing both op-
position to and support for a federal law regulating reclamation of surface mines 
across the States). In addition to requiring active coal companies to pay for fu-
ture reclamation, the law also imposes a fee on each ton of coal mined to be 
deposited into the Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund, which grants money to 
reclaim mines abandoned or left inadequately restored prior to SMCRA’s pas-
sage on August 3, 1977. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1231, 1234. 
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selves for the reclamation money—a process called self-bond-
ing.13 
For forty years, coal continued to be the primary fuel for 
electricity generation in the United States,14 and top coal mining 
companies like Peabody, Arch Coal, and Alpha Natural Re-
sources15 continued to mine and eventually pay to have the land 
reclaimed.16 However, beginning in 2015, the industry began to 
face serious changes. First, natural gas surpassed coal to become 
the dominant fuel for America’s electric grid.17 Next, Walter En-
ergy, Alpha Natural Resources, and several other major coal 
companies declared bankruptcy, causing many to wonder who 
would be next.18 The pattern of disconcerting industry changes 
continued in 2016. According to the U.S. Energy Information Ad-
ministration, coal production declined nationwide by seventeen 
percent from 2015–2016, falling to the lowest production level 
 
 13. Self-bonding is not only permitted in nineteen states, but accounts for 
a large percentage of outstanding reclamation bonds there. See infra note 53. 
 14. Natural Gas Expected To Surpass Coal in Mix of Fuel Used for U.S. 
Power Generation in 2016, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 16, 2016), http:// 
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=25392# (showing graphically the 
percentage of U.S. electricity generated from coal since the 1950s). 
 15. Major U.S. Coal Producers, 2015, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (2015), 
https://www.eia.gov/coal/annual/pdf/table10.pdf (showing Peabody ranked 
number one, Arch Coal at number two, and Alpha Natural Resources at number 
four). 
 16. There are three stages of the reclamation process, referred to as Phases 
I, II, and III. After each phase, the mining company submits evidence of recla-
mation to the relevant state agency. If the agency determines that reclamation 
was successful for that phase, the company can apply for release of a portion of 
its reclamation bond money. Before all the company’s reclamation money can 
be released, Phase III must be successfully completed. That only occurs ten 
years after final land seeding of an approved native seed mix consistent with 
the local plant communities. This means that large areas of mined land may get 
reclaimed, while the company still has not qualified for final bond release. E-
mail from Carol Bilbrough, Program Manager, Land Quality Div., Wyo. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Quality, to author (Feb. 23, 2017) (on file with author). For more infor-
mation about the reclamation process, see 30 C.F.R. § 800.42 (2017); see also 
OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, PERMANENT PROGRAM 
BOND RELEASE GUIDANCE (PHASES I, II, III) (May 8, 2009), https://www.wrcc 
.osmre.gov/resources/guidanceDocuments/050809Final_BR_Guidance.pdf 
(providing guidance on the release of reclamation bonds for coal mines). 
 17. Chris Mooney, This Huge Change in How We Get Energy Is Coming 
Much Faster Than Expected, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/03/21/this-huge 
-change-in-how-we-get-energy-is-coming-much-faster-than-expected. 
 18. Jody Xu Klein & Tim Loh, The Coal Miner “On Everybody’s List” as Next 
Bankruptcy Victim, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2016-01-21/the-coal-miner-on-everybody-s-list-as-next 
-bankruptcy-victim. 
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since 1978.19 Natural gas surpassed coal as the number one 
source of electricity for the entire year in 2016.20 Then Peabody 
Coal and Arch Coal, the country’s two largest coal producers, de-
clared bankruptcy.21  
After these bankruptcy announcements, environmentalists, 
taxpayers, and people living in mine-dependent communities be-
gan demanding answers.22 If a mining company has self-
bonded—meaning that it has promised to pay for reclamation on 
the assumption that it would be solvent at the time the cleanup 
commences—what happens when the company goes bankrupt? 
In March 2016, one environmental group, WildEarth Guardians, 
decided to formally address this concern with the federal govern-
ment by petitioning for a rulemaking to the Office of Surface 
Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE), requesting a 
change in self-bonding policy under SMCRA. 
This Note is about the struggle to hold self-bonded coal com-
panies accountable for reclamation after they have declared 
bankruptcy, focusing in particular on WildEarth Guardians’ 
March 2016 Petition for Rulemaking. Part I lays out the relevant 
 
 19. Brian Park, Coal Production Declines in 2016, with Average Coal Prices 
Below Their 2015 Level, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 9, 2017), http://www 
.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=29472&utm_source=&utm_medium= 
email&utm_campaign=5623 (“Low natural gas prices, warmer-than-normal 
temperatures during the 2015[–2016] winter that reduced electricity demand, 
the retirements of some coal-fired generators, and lower international coal de-
mand have contributed to declining U.S. coal production.”). 
 20. Competition Between Coal and Natural Gas Affects Power Markets, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 16, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/ 
detail.php?id=31672 (“In 2016, natural gas provided 34% of total electricity gen-
eration, surpassing coal to become the leading generation source.”). 
 21. Clifford Krauss, Peabody Energy, a Coal Giant, Seeks Bankruptcy Pro-
tection, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/14/ 
business/energy-environment/peabody-energy-coal-chapter-11-bankruptcy 
-protection.html; Tracy Rucinski, Arch Coal Files for Bankruptcy, Hit by Mining 
Downturn, REUTERS (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-arch 
-coal-restructuring-idUSKCN0UP0MR20160111. 
 22. In fact, the public began to ask so many questions and environmental 
groups doggedly filed so many complaints that the Director of the Office of Sur-
face Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE) held a conference call with 
reporters to express his own concerns and doubts. Benjamin Storrow, Concerned 
About Self-Bonding, Top Federal Mining Regulator Wonders About Collusion, 
CASPER STAR TRIB. (May 18, 2016), http://www.trib.com/business/energy/ 
concerned-about-self-bonding-top-federal-mining-regulator-wonders-about/ 
article_f5f5565a-2a8b-52e9-8d4f-c68d28f76c39.html. Then OSMRE issued its 
first policy advisory since its establishment in 1977 on the restricted use of self-
bonding by states. See Press Release, OSMRE, OSMRE Issues Policy Advisory 
Regarding Use of Self-Bonding for Coal Mine Reclamation (Aug. 9, 2016), 
https://www.osmre.gov/resources/newsroom/news/2016/080916.pdf. 
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law, beginning with a description of the policy battle between 
states and the federal government, and between eastern and 
western states, that culminated in the passage of SMCRA. 
SMCRA’s self-bonding provision then is explored in detail. Part 
II contextualizes the Petition for Rulemaking by describing the 
U.S. coal industry’s decline since 2011 and discussing Petition-
ers’ specific requests, as well as the opposing parties’ main coun-
terarguments. Finally, Part III looks to the future of self-bonding 
as a reclamation-funding tool. An examination of possible federal 
agency, state agency, and legislative actions shows that there is 
more than one way to approach the problem. Ultimately, this 
Note argues that a combination of federal rule changes and state 
agency efforts would provide the best solution to help ensure rec-
lamation efforts occur as planned.  
I.  DIGGING INTO MINING LEGISLATION: LEGAL 
CONTEXT OF SELF-BONDING   
Coal mining is regulated under the federal Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA).23 This Part pro-
vides an overview of SMCRA’s history, along with specific as-
pects of the law pertaining to self-bonding. This history illus-
trates the delicate balance struck between federal and state 
authority that is at stake in the rulemaking petition. 
A. HOW CONTENTIOUS COAL MINING LEGISLATION BECAME 
LAW 
Prior to SMCRA’s enactment, individual states created their 
own legislation to regulate coal mining activity.24 Very little was 
enforced in the way of coal mining reclamation.25 Though surface 
mining accounts for environmental damage including water pol-
lution, erosion and flooding, air pollution, destruction of fish and 
wildlife habitats, and noise pollution,26 few states undertook the 
 
 23. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 
(2012). 
 24. John D. Edgcomb, Comment, Cooperative Federalism and Environmen-
tal Protection: The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 
58 TUL. L. REV. 299, 305–06 (1983) (discussing the increasing levels of state 
regulation of surface mining before 1977). 
 25. Id. at 305 (“No state was engaged in enforcing surface mining reclama-
tion until 1939 . . . . During the late 1940’s [sic] and early 1950’s [sic] a number 
of other states passed . . . legislation, but these efforts were usually quite ‘mild’ 
in nature and normally contained numerous exemptions.”). 
 26. Id. at 303–05. For impacts of surface mining, see generally ALEXIS 
BONOGOFSKY ET AL., NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N ET AL., UNDERMINED PROMISE II 
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practice of enforcing reclamation.27 In the late 1960s, conserva-
tion groups, believing that the minimal state legislation in exist-
ence was not enough to regulate the environmental impacts of 
mines, began several campaigns to strengthen states’ laws on 
the subject.28 Some states responded by substantially toughen-
ing their legislation, and arguments were made by state political 
figures that the federal government should not get involved at 
all.29 However, entering the 1970s, Congress came to realize that 
the mining industry was not policing itself.30 In an effort to cre-
ate and enforce consistent and meaningful standards, Congress 
set to work on what would eventually become SMCRA.31 
Developing legislation that could get through Congress 
proved extremely difficult. SMCRA’s legislative history reveals 
that the battle involved six years of extensive hearings, bitter 
debate, and two presidential vetoes before it finally passed.32 
“The eighty-eight page bill represents an attempt to ‘strike a bal-
ance between protection of the environment and agricultural 
productivity and the Nation’s need for coal as an essential source 
of energy.’”33 Ultimately, SMCRA serves several purposes: (1) it 
acknowledges the nation’s interests in protecting the environ-
ment; (2) assures the nation’s coal supply as a necessary source 
of energy; and (3) fills a statutory gap to regulate coal mining 
and reclamation in a way that the other federal environmental 
statutes in existence at that time—such as the Clean Air Act and 
the Clean Water Act—did not.34 
 
(2015) [hereinafter UNDERMINED PROMISE II], http://www.underminedpromise 
.org/UnderminedPromiseII.pdf (providing the updated “status of coal surface 
mine reclamation”). 
 27. “Disproportionate industry influence in state political circles” and the 
fear of a “‘regulatory atmosphere’ which could drive off potential or existing 
mine operators” contributed to inadequate state regulatory programs. Edgcomb, 
supra note 24, at 307–08. 
 28. Id. at 306. 
 29. Id.; see, e.g., Surface-Mined Land Conservation and Reclamation Act, 
1971 Ill. Laws 2881; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 350.010–.990 (West 1963); Surface 
Mining and Reclamation, 1967 W. Va. Acts 909. 
 30. Edgcomb, supra note 24, at 306. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 311–12. 
 33. Id. (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1202(f ) (Supp. III 1979)). 
 34. KATIE M. SWEENEY & SHERRIE A. ARMSTRONG, AM. BAR ASS’N: SEC-
TION OF ENV’T, ENERGY, & RES., COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW: A GROWING ROLE FOR INDUSTRY 4 (Oct. 9, 2013), https://www 
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/environment_energy_resources/ 
2013/10/21st_fall_conference/conference_materials/17-sweeney_katie-paper 
.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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However, Congress understood that states must play a crit-
ical role in mining regulations. While SMCRA created the fed-
eral Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OS-
MRE) to oversee compliance with the statute,35 Congress also 
determined that “because of the diversity in terrain, climate, bi-
ologic, chemical, and other physical conditions in areas subject 
to mining operations, the primary governmental responsibility 
for developing, authorizing, issuing, and enforcing regulations 
for surface [coal] mining and reclamation operations . . . should 
rest with the States.”36 To integrate competing federal and state 
power, SMCRA established a federal-state partnership scheme. 
Congress set national minimum standards for surface coal min-
ing operations, and delegated authority to the federal agency 
OSMRE to interpret those provisions and promulgate proce-
dures for their implementation.37 Then, states had the oppor-
tunity to submit their own statutory and regulatory regime for 
coal mine operations within their jurisdiction, so long as they 
met the minimum standards in SMCRA.38 If OSMRE deter-
mined that a state’s program met the requirements, the state 
obtained exclusive jurisdiction over surface coal mining and rec-
lamation on nonfederal lands.39 In other words, the federal pro-
visions of SMCRA became irrelevant, and OSMRE retained only 
limited oversight to ensure that the state’s program is en-
forced.40 This federalism scheme inevitably led to tensions, 
which will be discussed in Part II. With this background on how 
SMCRA became law, the next Sections turn to specifics about 
the requirements and enforcement of SMCRA’s self-bonding pro-
vision. 
B. HOW SMCRA REQUIRES RECLAMATION BONDS 
“The central requirement of SMCRA is that the regulatory 
authority must approve a permit before any person may operate 
 
 35. 30 U.S.C. § 1211 (2012). 
 36. Id. § 1201(f ). 
 37. Id. § 1211(c)(1)–(2). 
 38. Id. § 1253. 
 39. Id. Twenty-four states have primacy over mining operations in their 
jurisdictions. Self-Bonding Facts, OSMRE, http://www.osmre.gov/resources/ 
selfBonding.shtm (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). 
 40. SWEENEY & ARMSTRONG, supra note 34, at 4–5; cf. Bragg v. W. Va. Coal 
Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275, 293–98 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that a private citizen suit 
brought in federal court alleging a violation of SMCRA was barred by the Elev-
enth Amendment because West Virginia had state primacy over its mining pro-
gram and therefore was not implementing federal law). 
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a coal mine.”41 A “precondition to the issuance of a mining permit 
is the coal mine operator’s demonstration of financial responsi-
bility, satisfied by posting a reclamation bond in an amount ‘suf-
ficient to assure the completion of the reclamation plan if the 
work had to be performed by the regulatory authority.’”42 There 
are three major types of reclamation bonds: corporate surety 
bonds, collateral bonds, and self-bonds.43 The most important 
type of reclamation bond for the purposes of this Note is the self-
bond.44 
A self-bond is a legally binding corporate promise, without 
separate surety or collateral, that is available only to permittees 
who meet certain financial tests.45 The allowance for self-bonds 
is laid out in SMCRA at 30 U.S.C. § 1259(c): “The regulatory au-
thority may accept the bond of the applicant itself without sepa-
rate surety when the applicant demonstrates to the satisfaction 
of the regulatory authority . . . a history of financial solvency and 
continuous operation sufficient for authorization to self-insure 
or bond such amount . . . .”46 This provision was originally pro-
posed in the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Re-
sources.47 The legislative history of the provision states simply, 
“Subsection (c) recognizes that some applicants can satisfy the 
objectives of the bond requirement through self-insurance or 
 
 41. Maureen D. Carmen & Richard Warne, SMCRA Enforcement in Bank-
ruptcy: Regulatory Powers Revisited, 25 ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. ch. 7, 187 
(2005). The regulatory authority is either OSMRE or a state agency, if OSMRE 
has approved the state’s system to obtain “primacy” over coal mining activities 
within its borders. Id. 
 42. Id. at 188 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1259(a)). 
 43. Reclamation Performance Bonds: Bonding Overview, OSMRE, https:// 
www.osmre.gov/resources/bonds/bondsoverview.shtm (last updated Apr. 24, 
2017). A corporate surety bond is a guarantee of a permittee’s performance by 
an outside surety company, made based on that company’s assessment of the 
permittee’s credit rating, experience, and net worth. Id. The surety company is 
promising to reclaim a mined site if the permittee fails to do so. Id. A collateral 
bond is a permittee’s sacrifice of some form of collateral (such as cash; certifi-
cates of deposit; first-lien interests in real estate; letters of credit; federal, state, 
or municipal bonds; and investment-grade securities) to be held by the regula-
tory authority until reclamation is completed. Id. 
 44. This Note will use “self-bond” generally to refer to self-bonds by the 
mine operator, parent corporate guarantees, and nonparent corporate guaran-
tees unless otherwise specified. 
 45. Self-Bonding Facts, supra note 39. 
 46. 30 U.S.C. § 1259(c). This provision was originally proposed in the Sen-
ate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources Amendments to House Bill 2. 
S. REP. NO. 95-128 (1977). 
 47. S. REP. NO. 95-128, at 1. 
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bonding.”48 According to the Senate Committee, the purpose of 
the bond was “having a fund available to accomplish reclama-
tion.”49 
There are three entities who may qualify to guarantee a self-
bond. The same term is often applied to each situation, but the 
proper terminology is as follows:  
  A “self-bond” is guaranteed by the mine operator, usually a subsid-
iary of a larger parent corporation. 
  A “parent corporate guarantee” is guaranteed by the parent corpo-
ration of the mine operator, which is sometimes also a subsidiary of a 
larger parent corporation. . . . 
  A “non-parent corporate guarantee” is guaranteed by an entity that 
is neither the mine operator nor its direct parent . . . . [T]he guarantor 
may be within the same corporate family, or may be non-affiliated.50 
The main advantage of self-bonds for operators is that they 
do not tie up property, cash, or credit capacity with regulatory 
authorities and financial institutions, or require the payment of 
surety-bond premiums.51 “SMCRA allows state regulatory au-
thorities to accept self-bonds as a matter of discretion; it does not 
require them to do so.”52 However, nineteen states allow self-
bonding, and ten of those states actually have self-bonded sur-
face mining permits issued.53 It may be optional under the stat-
ute, but it is a reality on the ground. This means that SMCRA’s 
 
 48. Id. at 78. 
 49. Id. Interestingly, the Interstate Mining Compact Commission (IMCC), 
a current opponent of the Petition for Rulemaking, met in Harrisburg, Pennsyl-
vania, in early 1977, to read through the proposed Senate Amendments to 
House Bill 2 and make suggestions to be shared with Congress. Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: Hearings on S.7 Before the Subcomm. on 
Public Lands and Res. of the S. Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., 95th Cong. 174 
(1977). The IMCC specifically suggested a “[s]trengthening amendment to dis-
allow ‘self insuring.’” Id. at 1190. Its rationale was that “[n]o history of solvency 
assures future solvency nor does self-bonding make funds readily accessible to 
the regulatory authority to carry out reclamation plans, but it must litigate with 
the company to acquire the funds.” Id. 
 50. UNDERMINED PROMISE II, supra note 26, at 12. 
 51. Id. at 11–12. 
 52. OSMRE, Policy Advisory: Self-Bonding 3 (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www 
.osmre.gov/resources/bonds/DirPolicyAdvisory-SelfBond.pdf [hereinafter OS-
MRE, Policy Advisory].  
 53. Self-Bonding Facts, supra note 39. Self-bonding is not just present in 
those states, but accounts for a huge percentage of those states’ outstanding 
reclamation bonding. For example, in 2014, self-bonding accounted for seventy 
percent ($338,439,944) of outstanding reclamation bonds in New Mexico and 
sixty-three percent ($2,138,201,079) in Wyoming. Self-Bonding Survey, INTER-
STATE MINING COMPACT COMM’N 7–9 (2014), http://imcc.isa.us/Self%20Bonding 
%20Survey.pdf. 
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self-bonding provision may inadvertently create reclamation-en-
forcement problems in ten states if the company guaranteeing 
the self-bond does not have sufficient resources for reclamation 
when mining is complete. Having identified self-bonds as a prev-
alent type of reclamation bond, the next Section turns to the fed-
eral requirements for a company who wishes to use self-bonds. 
C. HOW OSMRE REGULATES SELF-BONDS 
Pursuant to its duty to interpret and implement SMCRA’s 
minimum standards for surface coal mining operations, OSMRE 
has promulgated rules governing self-bonding over the years. 
The most stringent rules were enacted in 1979, but a petition for 
rulemaking and several lawsuits initiated by industry and pub-
lic interest groups led OSMRE to revise the rules in 1983.54 
These 1983 rules have remained substantially the same to this 
day, with the inclusion of a 1988 amendment allowing third par-
ties to guarantee a self-bond.55 OSMRE’s regulations governing 
self-bonding are listed at 30 C.F.R. § 800.23. They describe the 
minimum requirements a mining company must demonstrate to 
qualify for a self-bond.56 
According to 30 C.F.R. § 800.23(b), a state regulatory au-
thority may accept a self-bond from an applicant for a permit if 
all of the following conditions are met by the applicant or its par-
ent corporation guarantor: First, “[t]he applicant has been in 
continuous operation as a business entity for a period of not less 
than five years.”57 Second, the applicant must submit financial 
information in sufficient detail to show that the applicant: (1) 
“has a current rating for its most recent bond issuance of ‘A’ or 
 
 54. See Bond and Insurance Requirements for Surface Coal Mining and 
Reclamation Operations, 48 Fed. Reg. 32,932 (July 19, 1983). The 1979 rules as 
originally proposed would have required an applicant for self-bonding to demon-
strate compliance with SMCRA over a ten-year period and required that a mort-
gage or security interest in property at least equal to the bonded liability be 
granted to the regulatory authority. L. Thomas Galloway & Thomas J. Fitzger-
ald, The Bonding Program Under the 1977 Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act: Chaos in the Coalfields, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 675, 686 (1987). 
 55. See Bond and Insurance Requirements for Surface Coal Mining and 
Reclamation Operations Under Regulatory Programs, 53 Fed. Reg. 997 (Jan. 
14, 1988). 
 56. Since federal regulations set the minimum requirements for mining op-
erations, states with approved programs may set more stringent requirements 
in their own regulations. Carmen & Warne, supra note 41, at 187. 
 57. 30 C.F.R. § 800.23(b)(2) (2017). “Continuous operation” is defined as an 
entity that conducted business over a period of five years immediately preceding 
the time of application. Id. 
 2018] RECLAIMING RECLAMATION 1461 
 
higher as issued by either Moody’s Investor Service or Standard 
and Poor’s Corporation”; (2) “has a tangible net worth of at least 
$10 million, a ratio of total liabilities to net worth of 2.5 times or 
less, and a ratio of current assets to current liabilities of 1.2 
times or greater”; or (3) “[t]he applicant’s fixed assets in the 
United States total at least $20 million, and the applicant has a 
ratio of total liabilities to net worth of 2.5 times or less, and a 
ratio of current assets to current liabilities of 1.2 times or 
greater.”58 Third, the “total amount of the outstanding and pro-
posed self-bonds of the applicant for surface coal mining and rec-
lamation operations must not exceed 25 percent of the appli-
cant’s tangible net worth in the United States.”59 Finally, the 
last condition is more of a warning: the state regulatory author-
ity may require self-bonded applicants to submit an update of 
the aforementioned information within ninety days after the 
close of each fiscal year.60 
If a permittee intends to use a “parent corporate guarantee,” 
the conditions apply to the parent corporation as if it were the 
applicant.61 If a permittee intends to use a “non-parent corporate 
guarantee,” the conditions apply to both the applicant and the 
corporate guarantor.62 While this may seem like a thorough 
check into the financial history of each applicant and guarantor, 
the conditions overlook several key factors, particularly related 
to corporate structuring, that may create reclamation-enforce-
ment problems and recently led to public outcry from environ-
mental groups. 
II.  BURIED IN DEBT: HOW A MASSIVE DECLINE IN THE 
COAL INDUSTRY LED TO A PETITION FOR RULEMAKING   
The self-bonding provision in SMCRA works well when a 
mining company is solvent. However, if market demand for coal 
wanes and mining companies begin to struggle financially, self-
bonding becomes a risky way to finance reclamation. Section A 
describes how such a situation played out over the last eight 
years, resulting in numerous mining-company bankruptcies and 
 
 58. Id. § 800.23(b)(3). 
 59. Id. § 800.23(d). 
 60. Id. § 800.23(f ). 
 61. Id. § 800.23(c)(1). 
 62. Id. § 800.23(c)(2). Note, however, that the § 800.23(b)(3) financial re-
quirements only apply to the guarantor in the case of a non-parent corporate 
guarantee, unless the regulatory authority specifically requests the (b)(3) finan-
cial information from the applicant. Id. 
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finally WildEarth Guardians’ Petition for Rulemaking. Section 
B explains how problematic assumptions implicit in the self-
bonding regulations have been revealed as coal companies enter 
bankruptcy. Section C identifies petitioners’ main concerns and 
describes the groups who commented in favor of the rulemaking. 
Finally, Section D looks at the counterarguments made by 
groups who opposed the rulemaking. Together, these Sections 
contain the context necessary to meaningfully address the future 
of self-bonding in the coal industry. 
A. BACKGROUND ON RECENT COAL MINING BANKRUPTCIES 
Leading up to 2011, coal companies entered large acquisi-
tion deals, financed heavily with debt, to capitalize on a tempo-
rary rise in coal price.63 Soon after, however, cheap natural gas 
made available by hydraulic fracking technologies undercut do-
mestic thermal coal markets, and the coal companies began to 
flounder.64 Over a period of eight months from 2015 to early 
2016, four of the largest U.S. coal mine operators filed for Chap-
ter 11 protection under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.65 Then in 
April 2016, Peabody Energy, the world’s largest privately-owned 
coal company, announced that it had filed for Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy, following a significant downturn in the coal market that 
left the company saddled with debt.66 Peabody’s Chapter 11 fil-
ing was the latest in a series of coal industry bankruptcies that 
affected more than fifty companies since 2012; producers ac-
counting for forty-five percent of coal output have filed for bank-
ruptcy in the current industry downturn, according to 2014 U.S. 
government figures.67 In 2017, as coal production costs continue 
to rise due to economic and geologic factors while global markets 
and domestic competition for electricity generation push coal 
 
 63. UNDERMINED PROMISE II, supra note 26, at 13; see also Mayur Son-
takke, Should You Expect Big U.S. Coal Mergers and Acquisitions Soon?, MKT. 
REALIST (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.marketrealist.com/2014/12/understanding 
-consolidation-us-coal-industry (describing the acquisition deals in general).  
 64. See Mooney, supra note 17 (describing the effect of fracking technolo-
gies on coal markets). 
 65. These companies were Arch Coal, Alpha Natural Resources, Patriot 
Coal, and Walter Energy. See Klein & Loh, supra note 18 (describing the com-
panies). 
 66. Bryan Dewan, The World’s Largest Private Coal Company Just Filed 
for Bankruptcy, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 13, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/the 
-worlds-largest-private-coal-company-just-filed-for-bankruptcy-32946551e2d5. 
 67. Id. 
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prices down, the pressures on coal producers show no sign of re-
lenting.68 Although President Trump promised to deliver much-
needed regulatory and financial support to the coal industry dur-
ing the 2016 campaign season,69 it seems unlikely that the coal 
market itself will improve in the long term.70 Bankruptcy pro-
ceedings are the new reality for coal producers, and have re-
cently illuminated some fundamental problems with the practice 
of self-bonding. 
B. ASSUMPTIONS IN SELF-BONDING RULES COME TO LIGHT 
ONCE BANKRUPTCY OCCURS 
When a mining company or its guarantor declares bank-
ruptcy, the full amount of its self-bonds cannot be guaranteed. 
But, as interpreted by OSMRE and by state regulatory authori-
ties, the regulations set forth at 30 C.F.R. § 800.23 may actually 
 
 68. UNDERMINED PROMISE II, supra note 26, at 13; see also Barack Obama, 
The Irreversible Momentum of Clean Energy, SCIENCE (Jan. 9, 2017), http:// 
science.sciencemag.org/content/early/2017/01/06/science.aam6284.full (noting 
the shift to lower-emitting natural gas). But see Elias Johnson, U.S. Coal Pro-
duction and Coal-Fired Electricity Generation Expected To Rise in Near Term, 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/ 
detail.php?id=29872 (“In 2017 and 2018, as natural gas prices are expected to 
increase, coal is expected to regain some share of the electricity generation mix, 
and coal production is expected to increase slightly.”). 
 69. See, e.g., Donald Trump, Trump Outlines Plan for American Energy Re-
naissance, VOTE SMART (Sept. 22, 2016), https://votesmart.org/public 
-statement/1135044/trump-outlines-plan-for-american-energy-renaissance# 
.WdxEtkyZPGI (“[Our energy policy] will end the war on coal. I will rescind the 
coal mining lease moratorium, the excessive Interior Department stream rule, 
and conduct a top-down review of all anti-coal regulations issued by the Obama 
Administration.”). But see Justin Worland, Donald Trump Says He’ll Bring 
Back Coal. Here’s Why He Can’t, TIME (Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.time.com/ 
4570070/donald-trump-coal-jobs (describing why this promise is unlikely to be 
upheld); Clifford Krauss & Michael Corkery, A Bleak Outlook for Trump’s Prom-
ises to Coal Miners, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
11/20/business/energy-environment/a-bleak-outlook-for-trumps-promises-to 
-coal-miners.html (describing the challenges the then president-elect would face 
in order to deliver on his promises). 
 70. Yet coal companies remained hopeful as coal production increased 
slightly at the end of 2016. See Heather Richards, Despite Dark Times, Coal 
Ends 2016 on a More Positive Note, CASPER STAR TRIB. (Dec. 27, 2016), https:// 
www.trib.com/business/energy/despite-dark-times-coal-ends-on-a-more 
-positive-note/article_823f6e71-380d-537a-a14e-897c48b53453.html (“In the af-
terglow of the holiday season, following an increase in coal production at the 
end of the year, an industry knocked to its knees in 2016 is showing budding 
optimism.”). 
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allow companies to self-bond even where they do not have a his-
tory of financial solvency.71 To the extent the rules allow for non-
parent corporate guarantees, they do not explicitly require reg-
ulatory authorities to account for the financial viability of the 
non-parent’s parent corporation.72 For example, OSMRE stated 
in 2014: 
While it may be true that both Peabody Energy Company and Arch 
Coal, Inc. do not meet the requirements for self-bonding, they are not 
the guarantors for their mines’ self-bonds. There are subsidiary com-
panies in both instances that do meet the requirements for self-bonds, 
and are the guarantors. This practice is in full compliance with Federal 
and State laws.73 
However, this statement assumes that an insolvent subsidiary 
is not a reflection of its parent companies. In reality, this has 
proved to be a false assumption. When Arch Coal filed for bank-
ruptcy on January 11, 2016, the company’s subsidiary, Arch 
Western Resources, also filed for bankruptcy.74 When Peabody 
Energy filed for bankruptcy on April 13, 2016, the company’s 
subsidiary, Peabody Investments Corporation, also filed for 
bankruptcy.75 Put simply, recent coal mining bankruptcies have 
shown that financial troubles for a larger umbrella company will 
often impact the subsidiaries under that umbrella too. 
In a bankruptcy situation, it is doubtful that a company will 
agree to produce some other form of reclamation bond, such as 
surety or collateral, without a great deal of political pressure, 
since producing another form of bond would make the company’s 
bankruptcy position worse. “[O]btaining a third-party surety 
bond or posting additional collateral to guarantee reclamation ‘if 
achievable at all, could entail significant expense and directly 
impact the Debtors’ liquidity position.’”76 A U.S. Bankruptcy 
 
 71. WildEarth Guardians, Petition for the Amendment of a Rule to the Of-
fice of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement 1 (Mar. 3, 2016) [herein-
after Petition for Rulemaking]. 
 72. Id. at 7. The Petition for Rulemaking points out that the rules have 
been interpreted to not require regulatory authorities to consider the fact that 
the non-parent corporation’s assets may be pledged to a parent corporation’s 
debt, or to consider other factors that may link the financial health of a subsid-
iary with a parent company. Id. 
 73. Id. at 5 (quoting Exhibit 5, OSMRE Self-Bonding Fact Sheet). 
 74. Id. at 6. 
 75. Peabody Investments Corp., Docket No. 4:16-bk-42549 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mo. Apr. 13, 2016); Company Overview of Peabody Investments Corp., BLOOM-
BERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot 
.asp?privcapId=29868771 (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). 
 76. Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 71, at 6 n.5 (attributing a quotation 
to Exhibit 5 at 9, but actually quoting Exhibit 6, Notice of the Debtors’ Motion 
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Court allowed at least one company in this situation (Arch Coal) 
to continue self-bonding for a time despite bankruptcy.77 As 
these bankruptcy proceedings have revealed problematic as-
sumptions implicit within the self-bonding regulations, citizens 
have become increasingly concerned and pushed for change, 
demonstrated by the 2016 Petition for Rulemaking. 
C. WHAT THE PETITIONERS WANT 
On March 3, 2016, WildEarth Guardians, a nonprofit con-
servation advocacy organization headquartered in New Mexico, 
filed a petition for rulemaking with OSMRE.78 Pursuant to 
30 U.S.C. § 1211(g), “any person may petition the [OSMRE] Di-
rector to initiate a proceeding for the issuance, amendment, or 
repeal of a rule under this chapter.”79 WildEarth Guardians 
asked OSMRE to amend self-bonding regulations at 30 C.F.R. 
§ 800.23 to ensure that companies with a history of financial in-
solvency are not allowed to self-bond coal mining operations.80 
WildEarth Guardians is specifically concerned about non-parent 
corporate guarantees, because the current rules do not contem-
plate that subsidiary corporations may be insolvent by virtue of 
the insolvency of their parent or ultimate parent corporations.81 
If U.S. Bankruptcy Courts allow bankrupt companies to con-
tinue self-bonding—as has been done in the past82—the current 
rules present a very significant and real risk that some or all of 
the company’s reclamation obligations will eventually fall upon 
taxpayers; indeed, as currently applied, the rules do not achieve 
the objectives and purposes of SMCRA’s bonding require-
ments.83 
1. Proposed Rule Changes 
WildEarth Guardians attached redlined suggestions for new 
 
Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019, for Entry of a Stipulation and Order Con-
cerning Reclamation Bonding of Their Surface Coal Mining Operations in Wyo-
ming at 9, In re Arch Coal Inc., No. 16-40120-705 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Feb. 9, 
2016)). 
 77. Id. at 6. 
 78. Id. at 1. 
 79. 30 U.S.C. § 1211(g) (2012). 
 80. Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 71, at cover letter. 
 81. Id. at 5. 
 82. See id. at 6 (describing this occurrence with Arch Coal and their filings 
with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Eastern District of Missouri). 
 83. Id.  
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rule language to its Petition for Rulemaking,84 but emphasized 
that it would like to see OSMRE use a public rulemaking process 
to determine the final rule language.85 The suggested rule 
mainly focuses on adding provisions that would account for var-
ious forms of guarantors that are not currently considered in the 
rule. Specifically, WildEarth Guardians proposed the addition of 
a definition for “ultimate parent corporation” at 30 C.F.R. 
§ 800.23(a),86 and a provision regarding the need for regulatory 
authorities to account for the financial status of the ultimate 
parent corporation(s) of any corporate or non-parent corporate 
guarantors when assessing total self-bonding, net worth, and 
bankruptcy status.87 More controversially, WildEarth Guardi-
ans wants OSMRE to add a paragraph that forbids applicants, 
including parent corporations, with a history of bankruptcy in 
the last five years from self-bonding.88 If a permitted company 
files for bankruptcy, WildEarth Guardians wants the rules to 
trigger a duty upon the permittee to secure an alternate bond or 
be required to cease mining operations.89 
2. Comments in Favor of Petitioners’ Proposed Rule 
OSMRE sought comments on whether it should consider or 
deny changes to SMCRA, especially those proposed by 
WildEarth.90 One hundred seventeen thousand (117,000) com-
ments were received.91 About ninety-nine percent of the com-
ments were in favor of the rulemaking, while less than one per-
cent (thirteen unique comments) were opposed.92 Comments in 
 
 84. See id. at 8–11 (discussing the petitioned-for amendment rule). 
 85. Id. at 8. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 10–11. 
 88. Id. at 8–9. 
 89. Id. at 11. 
 90. Notice of Availability of Petition To Initiate Rulemaking and Request 
for Comments on the Petition, 81 Fed. Reg. 98 (published May 20, 2016) (to be 
codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 800). 
 91. WEG Petition for Rulemaking – Self-Bonding Docket Folder Summary 
(last updated Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=OSM-2016 
-0006.  
 92. Decision on Petition for Rulemaking, 81 Fed. Reg. 173, at 61,613 (pub-
lished Sept. 7, 2016) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 800). While OSMRE states 
that fourteen unique comments were opposed to the rulemaking, it included one 
neutral comment in that count. This neutral comment was submitted by the 
Surety & Fidelity Association of America, which is a nonprofit trade association 
of companies that write most of the nation’s surety and fidelity bonds. This com-
ment essentially explains how a surety operates under SMCRA. See Sur. & Fid. 
Ass’n of Am., Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 6, 2016), https://www 
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favor of the proposed rule mainly stemmed from environmental 
groups; Alliance for Appalachia, Conservation Law Center, En-
vironmental Law and Policy Center, Natural Resources Defense 
Council, and the national Sierra Club as well as the Illinois 
Chapter of Sierra Club were among the petitioners’ propo-
nents.93 However, many individuals wrote in as well.94 Mainly, 
these comments contained generic language that had been cop-
ied and pasted from the environmental groups’ websites. The 
New York University Institute for Policy Integrity wrote in to 
suggest some of its own policy changes.95 Taxpayers for Common 
Sense, a “nonpartisan budget watchdog” organization located in 
the District of Columbia, wrote in to support the rule in defense 
of taxpayers who, they argued, should not have to clean up after 
the mining industry.96 Commenters in favor of the rulemaking 
all agreed that the federal government should intervene in self-
bonding practices. 
D. WHAT THE PARTIES OPPOSING THE RULEMAKING WANT 
The thirteen unique comments opposing the rulemaking 
came from mining companies and state governments in states 
with significant mining activity. The mining and related electric 
companies were Edison Electric Institute; Luminant Generation 
Company; Murray Energy Corporation; National Mining Associ-
ation; Peabody Energy; Tri-State Generation and Transmission 
Association, Inc.; the Virginia Coal and Energy Alliance; and the 
 
.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0042. 
 93. See All. for Appalachia, Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 21, 
2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0061; Con-
servation Law Ctr., Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 11, 2016), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0044; Envtl. Law & 
Policy Ctr., Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0054; Sierra Club, 
Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016), https://www.regulations 
.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0050; Sierra Club – Ill. Chapter, Comment 
on Petition for Rulemaking (July 19, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/ 
document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0070. 
 94. See, e.g., Chloe B., Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 19, 2016), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0069; Caleb Laie-
ski, Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (June 29, 2016), https://www 
.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0039. 
 95. See NYU School of Law Inst. for Policy Integrity, Comment on Petition 
for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D= 
OSM-2016-0006-0062. 
 96. See Taxpayers for Common Sense, Comment on Petition for Rulemak-
ing (July 20, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006 
-0057. 
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Wyoming Mining Association.97 The state government groups 
were the Interstate Mining Compact Commission; the Indiana 
Department of Natural Resources; the Railroad Commission of 
Texas; the State of Wyoming (represented by Governor Matthew 
Mead); and the Wyoming Department of Environmental Qual-
ity.98 All of these comments voiced the same two main concerns: 
(1) the proposed rule does not properly account for SMCRA’s 
state primacy/federal oversight scheme, and (2) the proposed 
rule illegally discriminates against bankrupt companies. 
1. State Primacy Is an Integral Part of SMCRA That Cannot 
Be Ignored 
As explained in Part I.A., SMCRA gives states exclusive au-
thority to regulate surface mining once they have an approved 
program, while OSMRE simply plays the role of overseer with 
limited supervisory authority.99 One of the primary reasons why 
Congress chose this approach is the wide variation in geological 
 
 97. See Edison Elec. Inst., Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 15, 
2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0046; Lumi-
nant Generation, Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0065; Murray En-
ergy, Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016), https://www 
.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0058; Nat’l Mining Ass’n, Com-
ment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016), https://www.regulations 
.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0052; Peabody Energy, Comment on Peti-
tion for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/ 
document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0059; Tri-State Generation & Transmission 
Ass’n, Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016), https://www 
.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0060; Va. Coal & Energy All., 
Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016), https://www.regulations 
.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0051; Wyo. Mining Ass’n, Comment on Peti-
tion for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/ 
document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0047. 
 98. See Interstate Mining Compact Comm’n, Comment on Petition for Rule-
making (June 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM 
-2016-0006-0022; Ind. DNR, Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (June 23, 
2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0040; R.R. 
Comm’n of Tex., Comment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 8, 2016), https:// 
www.regulations.gov/document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0043; State of Wyo., Com-
ment on Petition for Rulemaking (July 20, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/ 
document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0068; Wyo. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, Comment on 
Petition for Rulemaking (July 19, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/ 
document?D=OSM-2016-0006-0048. 
 99. SWEENEY & ARMSTRONG, supra note 34, at 2. OSMRE steps in only if a 
state fails to obtain federal approval to administer its own program or fails to 
administer its program in accordance with the requirements of the Act. 
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and ecological conditions under which surface mining is con-
ducted.100 State agencies inherently have more familiarity with 
the specific mining problems within their jurisdiction. For exam-
ple, agencies in the southeast will understand the steep slope 
mining of the Appalachian Mountains, while agencies in the arid 
west will be best equipped to deal with relatively level surface 
mining.101 However, the state-federal governance divide in the 
statute creates a politically charged atmosphere. SMCRA regu-
lates private coal companies that have survived difficult eco-
nomic times by merging to create much larger, more powerful 
companies.102 These new behemoths are potent political forces 
at the state and national levels.103 
These same companies wrote in to complain that WildEarth 
Guardians “fail[ed] to recognize the benefits of local regulation 
that SMRCA was founded upon” by its proposal of nationwide 
fixed standards.104 One company lamented that the proposed 
rule changes eliminate any state discretion in the implementa-
tion of the bonding requirements, “in contravention of this coop-
erative approach.”105 In defense of state expertise, several com-
menters argued that “[s]tate regulatory programs have over 30 
years of front line regulatory experience with coal mine bond-
ing,” putting them “in the best position to determine whether 
and to what extent adjustments are needed.”106 Furthermore, 
the state regulatory authorities are the parties that will be most 
affected by any OSMRE actions taken with respect to financial 
assurance requirements.107 Overwhelmingly, the opposing com-
ments urge OSMRE to reject WildEarth Guardians’ petition, and 
instead work directly with state regulatory authorities to “un-
derstand the dimensions of the issues at stake and work toward 
the best possible solution for OSMRE, the States, and the public 
at large.”108 
 
 100. Edgcomb, supra note 24, at 312–13. 
 101. Id. 
 102. DENISE SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 154 
(2004). 
 103. Id. Scheberle uses one of the commenters on the Petition for Rulemak-
ing as an example: “When the National Mining Association speaks, politicians 
listen.” Id. 
 104. Wyo. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, supra note 98, at 3. 
 105. Edison Elec. Inst., supra note 97, at 5. 
 106. Ind. DNR, supra note 98, at 2; see also Interstate Mining Compact 
Comm’n, supra note 98; Nat’l Mining Ass’n, supra note 97, at 4 (remarking that 
states are best poised to evaluate and modify their programs moving forward). 
 107. Wyo. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, supra note 98, at 1. 
 108. Id. at 2. 
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On the other hand, environmental groups are nervous to 
support a cooperative plan between OSMRE and the states be-
cause, in the past, SMCRA’s deference to states has allowed 
them to create lax, unenforced programs. In 2007, Undermined 
Promise, the joint report on reclamation created by the National 
Resources Defense Council, National Wildlife Federation, and 
Western Organization of Resource Councils, reported that 
“in all, [OSMRE] has done less than 3 percent of the number of inspec-
tions the states have done each year;” for 2006 to 2013, this percentage 
remains the same. At 2.75% of the total number of state inspections, 
the number of federal site visits continues to be low despite increases 
in the total amount of acreage disturbed by mining in the five states.109 
This may not be a reason for concern, but environmental groups 
worry that state inspectors are too accommodating to industry, 
as shown by two surveys conducted in 1995 and 2002 in which 
responses indicated that state surface mining inspectors were 
more likely to embrace an accommodative orientation toward 
coal operators.110 In the same surveys, more than two-thirds of 
state officials strongly disagreed with the necessity of OSMRE 
oversight.111 The tension between federal and state oversight of 
mining is palpable in the comments for those opposing the Peti-
tion for Rulemaking.112 
2. Discrimination Against Bankrupt Companies Is Illogical 
and Illegal 
Opponents of the Petition for Rulemaking emphasized that, 
contrary to the image often conjured by the word “bankruptcy,” 
not all bankruptcies result in a company’s liquidation. There are 
six types of bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Code, usually la-
 
 109. UNDERMINED PROMISE II, supra note 26, at 36 (internal citation omit-
ted). 
 110. SCHEBERLE, supra note 102, at 182 (referring to surveys sent to state 
surface mining officials in twenty-four coal-producing states, along with eight-
een phone interviews which complemented the survey data). 
 111. Id. at 185. 
 112. See, e.g., State of Wyo., supra note 98, at 2 (“The OSMRE should allow 
time for [state] efforts to move forward. To do otherwise threatens the economies 
and livelihoods of thousands across the nation and in Wyoming.”). 
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belled by the titles of the chapters under which they are catego-
rized.113 The coal mining companies that have declared bank-
ruptcy did so under Chapter 11,114 which is also known as the 
“reorganization” chapter.115 This type of bankruptcy is generally 
“used by commercial enterprises that desire to continue operat-
ing a business and repay creditors concurrently through a court-
approved plan of reorganization.”116 Importantly, Chapter 11 re-
structuring does not imply either insolvency or the future failure 
of a company, as the National Mining Association pointed out in 
its comment to the Petition for Rulemaking.117 Furthermore, the 
National Mining Association and other industry commenters ar-
gue that just because a company has declared bankruptcy does 
not mean that it will be unable to provide for the reclamation 
needs; in fact, reclamation can be worked into the bankruptcy 
proceedings.118 
More significantly, the Bankruptcy Code prohibits discrimi-
nation based on bankruptcy status. Under § 525 of the Code, a 
debtor is expressly protected against discriminatory treatment 
by a governmental unit based solely on a bankruptcy filing, re-
gardless of whether the bankruptcy filing occurs before or during 
the case or proceeding.119 
The U.S. Supreme Court and other federal courts have routinely held 
that actions or inactions by governmental agencies that would not have 
occurred but for the bankruptcy of a debtor or former debtor are pro-
hibited by Section 525(a), and that such prohibition applies regardless 
 
 113. See Process – Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts 
.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/process-bankruptcy-basics 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (providing an overview and discussion of the six types 
of bankruptcy cases). 
 114. See, e.g., OSMRE, Policy Advisory, supra note 52, at 2 (noting that in 
the past few months, three of the largest coal companies have filed for Chapter 
11 bankruptcy). 
 115. Process – Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 113. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Nat’l Mining Ass’n, supra note 97, at 6–7. 
 118. E.g., id. at 5. The same comment also points out: “Many of the operators 
cited in WEG’s petition as alleged candidates for ineligibility to self-bond lead 
the country in reclamation success and routinely win reclamation awards from 
OSM for outstanding reclamation achievements.” Id. at 3. 
 119. 11 U.S.C. § 525 (2012). The statute specifically says: “[A] governmental 
unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license, permit, char-
ter, franchise, or other similar grant to, condition such a grant to, discriminate 
with respect to such a grant against, deny employment to, terminate the em-
ployment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against, a person that 
is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or a debtor under the 
Bankruptcy Act.” Id. § 525(a). 
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of whether the governmental agency’s action or inaction was motivated 
by a desire to enforce its regulatory mandate.120 
Since this type of illegal discrimination seems to be precisely the 
solution proposed by petitioners, opponents of the rulemaking 
used this Bankruptcy Code violation argument as their strong-
est reason for why OSMRE should not grant WildEarth Guardi-
ans’ petition. While there are evidently problems with the self-
bonding rules as they currently operate, those opposing the rule-
making raised convincing legal arguments based on the lan-
guage of SMCRA and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code which must be 
considered in the search for a solution going forward. 
III.  REDEMPTION IN COAL COUNTRY: THE FUTURE OF 
SELF-BONDED RECLAMATION   
As the rulemaking process makes clear, efforts to hold self-
bonded mining companies accountable for reclamation implicate 
long-standing tensions between environmental groups, taxpay-
ers, and industry, as well as divisions between eastern and west-
ern states, and federal and state agencies. One affected group 
that has not been explored in-depth in this Note deserves men-
tioning: the communities dependent on mining jobs. These com-
munities, while sympathetic to the industry, also reveal the need 
to change self-bonding regulations in the future. As discussed in 
Part I.A., unreclaimed mines are known to create adverse envi-
ronmental impacts, and mitigation of such damage served as a 
motivating factor for the initial passage of SMCRA.121 
However, there is more than merely environmental loss if a 
coal mining company cannot afford to reclaim its land or moves 
to a new location. People, families, and entire towns dependent 
on those coal jobs are left behind. Between 2008 and 2012, the 
national coal industry lost about 50,000 jobs.122 Many thousands 
more have been lost since then, and the numbers continue to de-
cline.123 Particularly in states like Kentucky and West Virginia, 
 
 120. Luminant Generation, supra note 97, at 3 (citing F.C.C. v. NextWave 
Pers. Commc’ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293 (2003); Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. 
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); In re 
Ray, 355 B.R. 253 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006)). 
 121. See supra Part I.A. 
 122. Chris Mooney, Study: Coal Industry Lost Nearly 50,000 Jobs in Just 
Five Years, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
energy-environment/wp/2015/04/01/the-decline-in-coal-jobs-in-one-chart/ 
?utm_term=.7f07e5571da1. 
 123. See generally, ANNUAL COAL REPORT: HIGHLIGHTS FOR 2015, U.S. EN-
ERGY & INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.eia.gov/coal/annual (providing 
information on the coal industry in the United States, including the number of 
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people have been facing the decision to either leave their homes, 
if they can afford it, or stay and reinvent new careers for them-
selves.124 For the sake of these people, ensuring continuous rec-
lamation is an urgent goal. At the very least, reclamation re-
stores some of the aesthetic beauty of these people’s homeland—
the loss of which John Prine mourned in Paradise. At best, rec-
lamation may be the key to creating new jobs.125 Section A dis-
cusses changes that should be made at the federal agency level. 
Section B discusses changes that are already underway and 
should continue at the state agency level. Section C notes that 
efforts at the legislative level may serve a backup function, in 
the event that the rulemaking does not occur or does not ade-
quately address the problems currently presented by self-bond-
ing. Overall, this Part looks to the future of self-bonding and of-
fers recommendations to safeguard reclamation in a way that 
 
mines, employment, and consumption of coal); Andrew Follett, Obama Kept His 
Promise, 83,000 Coal Jobs Lost and 400 Mines Shuttered, DAILY CALLER (Sept. 
5, 2016), http://www.dailycaller.com/2016/09/05/obama-kept-his-promise-83000 
-coal-jobs-lost-and-400-mines-shuttered (describing job loss in the coal industry 
during the Obama Administration); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Beyond Coal: Imagin-
ing Appalachia’s Future, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/08/18/us/beyond-coal-imagining-appalachias-future.html (profiling how 
towns in Kentucky are trying to recover from the loss of jobs in the coal mining 
industry). 
 124. For more information, pictures, and interviews about the impact of the 
coal industry’s decline in Appalachia, see the documentary series produced by 
AJ+ and published on YouTube. AJ+, The Unheard Story of Appalachia’s Coal, 
Part 1, YOUTUBE (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
1VBYsEGpLDI. Part 2 of the series describes how some people were unable to 
leave Kentucky after the decline of coal jobs because they could not afford it, 
while at the same time population data shows that (1) about 1100 people have 
been leaving eastern Kentucky every year since, and (2) the death rate is now 
higher than the birth rate. AJ+, How Coal’s Decline Devastated Appalachia, 
Part 2, YOUTUBE (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
UJxCqHoUAT8. 
 125. For example, a bipartisan bill called the RECLAIM Act was introduced 
in Congress in 2016 and again in 2017. See Revitalizing the Economy of Coal 
Communities by Leveraging Local Activities and Investing More (RECLAIM) 
Act of 2016, H.R. 4456, 114th Cong. (2016); RECLAIM Act of 2017, H.R. 1731, 
115th Cong. (2017). It seeks to amend SMCRA to make certain funds available 
for the Department of Interior to distribute to states that have suffered recent 
declines in mining jobs. H.R. 1731 – RECLAIM Act of 2017, CONGRESS.GOV 
(Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1731 
(providing a brief summary of the bill and its purposes). Essentially, the bill 
would put former miners to work reclaiming those same mines. Id.; see also RE-
CLAIM Act: Creating Jobs and Opportunities Out of Abandoned Mines, APPA-
LACHIAN CITIZENS’ LAW CTR., http://www.powerplusplan.org/reclaim-act (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2018). 
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will appease environmental groups, bring solace to coal commu-
nities that have been left behind, and collaborate with mining 
companies. 
A. THE PETITION FOR RULEMAKING SHOULD BE ADDRESSED AT 
THE FEDERAL AGENCY LEVEL 
On September 7, 2016, OSMRE announced its final decision 
with respect to WildEarth Guardians’ Petition for Rulemaking: 
“The Director has decided to grant the petition, although we do 
not intend to propose the specific rule changes requested in the 
petition.”126 Instead, OSMRE intends to initiate a notice-and-
comment rulemaking period to determine the ultimate extent 
and language of the rule changes. OSMRE admits that “the coal 
market is dramatically different from when our current self-
bonding regulations were drafted” and to “ensure the completion 
of the reclamation plan as required” under SMCRA, changes 
need to be made.127 The final decision lists several types of 
changes that may be considered, including revisions to statutory 
definitions, financial tests, and bonding requirements, as well as 
the possibility of developing a systematic review process with 
third-party review to periodically ascertain the true nature of 
mining companies’ financial health.128 Some of these changes 
should be combined with those in the following subsections to 
produce an effective solution. 
1. Consultation with State Agencies 
Before any changes are made, OSMRE should consult with 
state agencies to determine what changes they would prefer. As 
discussed in Part II.D.1., SMCRA sets up a federalism scheme 
that places state agencies at the forefront of regulating mine op-
erations.129 These agencies wield strong lobbying power, partic-
ularly with the new presidential administration.130 Most of the 
 
 126. Decision on Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 92, at 61,612. 
 127. Id. at 61,614. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Supra Part II.B.1. 
 130. See Why Coal Mines Close, W. VALUES PROJECT (June 27, 2016), http:// 
www.westernvaluesproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/6-27-16-WVP-Why 
-Coal-Mines-Close.pdf (“Over the past decade, [five of the United States’ major 
coal companies] funneled $100 million to DC lobbyists and politicians to protect 
the coal industry’s $167 million annual federal taxpayer subsidies.”); cf. For 
NMA, a New Administration and a New Congress Means a New Beginning, 
NAT’L MINING ASS’N (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.nma.org/2016/11/09/for-nma-a 
-new-administration-and-a-new-congress-means-a-new-beginning; Statement 
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comments opposing WildEarth Guardians’ Petition for Rulemak-
ing place emphasis on the deference typically shown to state 
agency decisions.131 By consulting with state agencies first, OS-
MRE will demonstrate a diplomatic willingness to keep political 
peace and maintain its credibility with the Trump Administra-
tion. OSMRE has already begun to take steps in this direction 
by stating at the end of its Decision on Petition for Rulemaking, 
“The state [regulatory agencies] have many years of experience 
with self-bonding and we will ask that they provide specific sug-
gestions on how to improve our regulations to ensure they have 
adequate financial assurance to complete reclamation of each 
mine.”132 Additionally, the Interstate Mining Compact Commis-
sion (IMCC), a multistate governmental organization, has been 
working with OSMRE’s Financial Assurance Coordination Team 
(FACT) since 2015 to address concerns about key elements of 
reclamation bonds, including self-bonds.133 Following through on 
its inclination to cooperate, negotiate, and consult with state 
agencies can only help OSMRE find a suitable outcome. 
2. Rejecting Illegal Rule Changes 
If OSMRE follows through with a federal rulemaking, com-
ments from the 2016 Petition for Rulemaking should be consid-
ered. The most obvious input that should be incorporated comes 
from opponents who pointed out the illegality of discriminating 
against bankrupt companies.134 Unless Congress amends the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which is not a proportionate or practical 
response to this narrow problem in the coal industry, there can-
not be a rule which allows OSMRE to “deny, revoke, suspend, or 
refuse to renew a . . . permit” on the basis of a company’s past or 
 
from Peabody Energy on U.S. Presidential Election, PEABODY ENERGY (Nov. 9, 
2016), http://www.peabodyenergy.com/content/120/press-releases (“With a new 
Administration comes a new day to find common ground in achieving shared 
policy goals.”). 
 131. See, e.g., Edison Elec. Inst., supra note 97 (“The proposed amendments 
. . . would deprive states of the discretion to consider self-bonding on a case-by-
case basis, consistent with the financial requirements already set forth in the 
existing regulations.”); Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, supra note 
97, at 2 (“OSMRE should retain the current rules at 30 CFR Part 800 that pro-
vide Regulatory Authorities the latitude to design and implement a regulatory 
program for their jurisdiction.”). 
 132. Decision on Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 92, at 61,615. 
 133. Gregory E. Conrad, State Regulatory Perspective re Mine Reclamation 
Bonding, paper submitted as part of IEEFA Energy Finance Training confer-
ence (Mar. 14, 2017) (on file with author). 
 134. Decision on Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 92, at 61,614. 
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current bankruptcy status.135 Therefore, Petitioners’ suggested 
changes to 30 C.F.R. § 800.23(b) are not lawful.136 However, the 
next Subsection describes a suggested rule change that would be 
beneficial. 
3. Amending Rules To Improve Financial Health 
Requirements and Review 
Petitioners’ proposal to broaden and strengthen financial 
solvency review would legally enable limitations on permitting 
before bankruptcy is declared. In its Decision on Petition for 
Rulemaking, OSMRE acknowledges that “the current regula-
tions do not require use of the most appropriate financial tests, 
both before a self-bond is approved and during the life of a self-
bond.”137 Petitioners’ suggest that financial regulations include 
assessments of companies up the corporate ladder, including ul-
timate parent corporations, the company at the very top of a par-
ticular corporate structure.138 They propose this be written into 
OSMRE’s rules as a new definition—ultimate parent corpora-
tions—in 30 C.F.R. § 800.23(a). This definition would then be in-
corporated into any provision that discusses the need for the reg-
ulatory authority to assess financial status of companies 
associated with a self-bond applicant. Such a requirement may 
have been helpful in the case of Arch Coal, for example, when 
that ultimate parent company declared bankruptcy, though its 
subsidiary, Thunder Basin Coal Company, technically still qual-
ified for self-bonding guaranteed by another subsidiary, Arch 
Western Resources.139 Petitioners’ proposed expansion of finan-
cial review procedures to ultimate parent corporations should be 
a strong contender for inclusion in the final rule change. 
Another way of approaching financial review change is by 
amending 30 C.F.R. § 800.23(f), or (g), or both. Paragraph (f) al-
lows a regulatory authority to require self-bonded applicants, 
and parent and non-parent corporate guarantors, to submit an 
update of the required financial information within ninety days 
after the end of each fiscal year following the issuance of the self-
bond or corporate guarantee.140 Paragraph (g) requires that, if 
at any time during the period when a self-bond is posted, the 
 
 135. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2012). 
 136. See Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 71, at 8–9. 
 137. Decision on Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 92, at 61,613. 
 138. Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 71, at 8. 
 139. Id. at 5. 
 140. 30 C.F.R. § 800.23(f ) (2017). 
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financial conditions of the applicant or parent or non-parent cor-
porate guarantor change so that the financial criteria are not 
satisfied, the permittee must notify the regulatory authority 
and, within ninety days, post an alternate form of bond in the 
same amount as the self-bond.141 The problem, as acknowledged 
by OSMRE, is that financial conditions of a company can change 
very quickly, and enforcement of these provisions is difficult.142 
Yearly check-ins on financial health are not enough in this vola-
tile time of slowing coal demand. And if a company forgets or 
chooses not to comply with the ninety-day-notice rule in para-
graph (g), perhaps hoping that the situation will improve soon, 
a state regulatory authority may not find out about the economic 
setbacks before the self-bonded entity or its parent company de-
clares bankruptcy. In its decision to grant the Petition for Rule-
making, OSMRE mentioned that it will explore ways in which to 
“clarify the penalties for an entity’s failure to disclose a change 
in financial status.”143 However, if a company is going bankrupt, 
it is unlikely that a financial penalty would be effective in moti-
vating disclosure. Instead, OSMRE should amend these provi-
sions to put the burden on the regulatory authority to more fre-
quently check up on the financial status of the self-bonded entity 
and its associated companies. Paragraph (f) could be amended to 
increase the frequency with which the regulatory authority must 
obtain financial updates. Or a new provision could be added 
about regular financial review, either by the regulatory author-
ity or by an independent third party, to motivate companies to 
comply with paragraph (g) or risk being discovered and penal-
ized for noncompliance. Increasing the frequency of checkups 
would help avoid the possibility of a regulatory authority miss-
ing changed financial circumstances. Furthermore, it would put 
the burden on state agencies to modify their regulatory regimes 
in such a way that maintains the federal-state cooperative power 
scheme; states would get to control the regulations, but subject 
to a slightly altered federal mandatory minimum set of rules. 
These rule changes are recommended because they are workable 
and strike a compromise. The changes would appease environ-
mental groups and taxpayers concerned with lax financial re-
 
 141. Id. § 800.23(g). 
 142. See, e.g., Decision on Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 92, at 61,614 
(“In other instances, the financial information came too late or too slowly for 
[regulatory authorities] to take enforcement action before the company declared 
bankruptcy.”). 
 143. Id. 
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view, and ease the tension between federal and state govern-
ment, while still allowing solvent mining companies to self-bond. 
OSMRE itself brought up the possibility of a controversial 
and important rule change unmentioned by Petitioners but 
likely to attract opposition from industry—mandatory diversifi-
cation of financial assurances.144 OSMRE explained, “Relying on 
just one type of financial assurance, such as self-bond or a surety 
bond from just one company, could be risky in an uncertain fi-
nancial market.”145 In other words, OSMRE may consider re-
quiring mining companies to provide a variety of reclamation 
bonds. This is a good idea, because coal companies will be imme-
diately prepared to cover reclamation costs should bankruptcy 
occur. Mandatory diversification is already a requirement in 
some states once coal companies can no longer meet financial re-
quirements for self-bonding, and it is the outcome of several re-
cent bankruptcy proceedings.146 It makes sense for the federal 
regulations to implement this requirement at the outset, before 
any bankruptcy declaration. Yet, this proposed change will prob-
ably garner controversy, given the prevalence and convenience 
of self-bonds for mining companies.147 Mandatory diversification 
means that companies would have to sacrifice valuable assets or 
money up front, a risky move during a time when demand for 
coal is decreasing. This rule change would not eliminate self-
bonding completely, but would make the practice less dominant 
in the industry. 
Of course, if a company is no longer allowed to purely self-
bond, it will need to put up sufficient collateral to cover all rec-
lamation obligations. OSMRE has admitted that the current reg-
ulations allow a small set of assets to be used as collateral for 
multiple liabilities.148 This could potentially pose a big problem 
for companies that may be imminently facing the need to cover 
each of multiple liabilities. If the total amount of liabilities in the 
long term exceeds the value of assets used as collateral, reclama-
tion obligations will not be met.149 OSMRE mentioned that it will 
consider ways to address this problem, including a requirement 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See infra notes 154–59 and accompanying text. 
 147. See supra notes 13 and 27. 
 148. See 30 C.F.R. § 800.21 (2017) for the OSMRE regulations governing col-
lateral bonds; see also Decision on Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 92, at 
61,614 (“Under our current regulations, the same small set of assets has been 
used as collateral for multiple liabilities.”).  
 149. Decision on Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 92, at 61,614. 
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that “a percentage of all bonds be supported by collateral not 
subject to any other lien nor used as collateral for any other mine 
or other liability.”150 Such a rule change is vital in order to give 
other rule changes any weight. If OSMRE eliminates or severely 
limits the practice of self-bonding and mandates diversification 
of financial assurances, those changes would be meaningless 
without a provision that requires separate collateral for separate 
liabilities. This requirement would need to be written into the 
rules as a new provision, probably in the section regarding col-
lateral bonds. 
B. EFFORTS AT THE STATE AGENCY LEVEL SHOULD CONTINUE 
TO ADDRESS SELF-BONDING 
Though states with exclusive authority over their mining 
programs responded negatively to the Petition for Rulemaking, 
they are taking steps on their own to address the problem of self-
bonding. Greg Conrad, Executive Director of the IMCC, wrote a 
paper for a presentation on March 14, 2017, at the Institute for 
Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) in which he 
stated: 
[O]ne of the states’ primary objectives with regard to the recent down-
turn in the coal industry and concomitant bankruptcy filings has been 
to insure [sic] that reclamation continues at the affected mines so that 
their taxpayers are not potentially saddled with the costs of reclaiming 
active mines . . . . Companies that no longer met financial criteria were 
ordered to replace their self-bonds and, in the interim, were required 
to continue reclamation operations unabated. To date, reclamation has 
continued and self-bonds have been replaced or are in the process of 
being replaced.151 
On the reclamation side, Conrad’s statements are supported by 
Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) data, 
which appears to show that Arch Coal, Alpha Natural Resources, 
nor Peabody Coal have yet to interrupt their continuing recla-
mation efforts (at least in Wyoming), despite recent and ongoing 
bankruptcy proceedings.152 For example, 2491.9 acres of Arch 
Coal’s Black Thunder Mine were released from Phase I reclama-
tion, 2441.3 acres released from Phase II, and 787.1 acres re-
leased from Phase III during the months that Arch Coal under-
went bankruptcy proceedings.153 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Conrad, supra note 133, at 9. 
 152. E-mail from Carol Bilbrough, supra note 16. 
 153. Id. To name a few more, Alpha’s Belle Ayr mine released 539.6 acres 
from Phase I reclamation and 510.4 acres from Phase II while Alpha was still 
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On the bankruptcy side, there has been a pattern of coal 
companies emerging from bankruptcy and, at least temporarily, 
shedding their self-bond liabilities. In July 2016, after long ne-
gotiations between the parties in the bankruptcy proceedings, 
Alpha Natural Resources reached a deal that prohibited future 
self-bonding.154 In October 2016, Arch Coal emerged from bank-
ruptcy and promised to replace its $411 million in self-bonds 
with traditional insurance to ensure reclamation truly happens 
at its Wyoming sites.155 In March 2017, Peabody Coal announced 
its intention to temporarily replace self-bonding in Indiana, Illi-
nois, New Mexico, and Wyoming with $1.26 billion in third-party 
surety bonds, and $14.5 million from a state bond pool by the 
time it emerged from bankruptcy in April of 2017.156 These ef-
forts show that companies have been willing to hold themselves 
accountable for reclamation even when self-bonds are no longer 
a viable option. However, reliance on companies to take respon-
sibility is not enough to ensure that reclamation eventually hap-
pens, especially once the political spotlight is removed. 
Some states have similarly started shifting away from ac-
cepting self-bonds over the last few years.157 Virginia stopped al-
lowing self-bonds on June 30, 2014, when the state’s advisory 
committee recommended no additional self-bonds be accepted.158 
 
in bankruptcy, and Peabody’s Shoshone #1 mine qualified as fully reclaimed. 
Id. For an explanation of the reclamation phases, see supra note 16. 
 154. Benjamin Storrow, Bankruptcy Court Approves Alpha Natural Re-
sources Bankruptcy Plan, Ends Self-Bonding, CASPER STAR TRIB. (July 7, 2016), 
http://www.trib.com/business/energy/bankruptcy-court-approves-alpha-natural 
-resources-bankruptcy-plan-ends-self/article_9381b194-72bf-5248-b7bf 
-56f96f1c0ad1.html. 
 155. Heather Richards, After Bankruptcy, Arch Coal Will Put Up Cash To 
Guarantee Mine Cleanup, CASPER STAR TRIB. (Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.trib 
.com/business/after-bankruptcy-arch-coal-will-put-up-cash-to-guarantee/ 
article_502daaac-f1b1-5aaa-9315-ee0e196a640e.html. 
 156. Heather Richards, Peabody To End Self-Bonds, For Now, CASPER STAR 
TRIB. (Mar. 8, 2017), http://www.trib.com/business/energy/peabody-to-end-self 
-bonds-for-now/article_97b7d420-fd13-559f-ae53-54fa47ab0a0f.html; see also 
Bryce Gray, Peabody Emerges from Bankruptcy; Stock Trading Resumes Tues-
day, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 4, 2017), http://www.stltoday.com/ 
business/local/peabody-emerges-from-bankruptcy-stock-trading-resumes 
-tuesday/article_4c379139-da5c-56a0-8c29-bafadb206ce9.html. 
 157. But cf. Tripp Baltz et al., No Collateral Needed for Cleanup in Some 
States Despite Mine Bankruptcies, BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 30, 2017), https:// 
www.bna.com/no-collateral-needed-n57982085962 (describing how numerous 
states like Arkansas, Wyoming, and Pennsylvania, are continuing to accept self-
bonded permits).  
 158. Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 71, at Exhibit 8, Self-Bonding Sur-
vey. 
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Also in 2014, a subsidiary of Luminant Mining was required by 
the state of Texas to replace $1.01 billion in self-bonds with cash 
bonds.159 As of January 2016, Colorado decided to “mov[e] away 
from self-bonding.”160 On November 7, 2017, the State of Wyo-
ming announced the imminent proposal of state regulations to 
limit self-bonding and strengthen financial review of mining 
companies that do not qualify to self-bond.161 It is unclear 
whether this trend is purely a result of states reacting to a 
changing energy market, or whether public outcry has influ-
enced states’ decisions. Either way, states have properly taken 
the lead in addressing problems with self-bonding. States must 
continue to take a strict stance when mining companies can no 
longer meet the financial requirements of self-bonds, as they 
have been tasked with regulatory and enforcement authority un-
der SMCRA and therefore owe a duty to their citizens to perform 
this task. 
C. EFFORTS AT THE LEGISLATIVE LEVEL MAY BE USED AS A 
RECOURSE 
This Note has focused on the 2016 Petition for Rulemaking 
and solutions that could be reached through that process. It is 
worth pointing out that the federal notice-and-comment rule-
making process can take a long time,162 especially during a pres-
idential administration that does not want to penalize the coal 
 
 159. Storrow, Concerned About Self-Bonding, supra note 22. 
 160. Leigh Paterson, CO “Moves Away” from Self-Bonding, INSIDE ENERGY 
(Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.insideenergy.org/2016/01/05/co-moves-away-from 
-self-bonding (quoting Todd Hartman, Communications Director at the Colo-
rado DNR). Colorado managed to get Peabody Energy to provide replacement 
bonding for twenty-seven million dollars in cleanup costs in April 2016, which 
led to the Director of OSMRE, Joe Pizarchik, to publicly question whether “col-
lusion” or “malfeasance” was involved in states like Wyoming where self-bond-
ing continued to be accepted. Storrow, Concerned About Self-Bonding, supra 
note 22. 
 161. Heather Richards, Wyoming Proposes Stronger Rules for Ensuring 
Clean Up from Coal Operations, CASPER STAR TRIB. (Nov. 7, 2017), http://www 
.trib.com/business/energy/wyoming-proposes-stronger-rules-for-ensuring-clean 
-up-from-coal/article_0dadf9b3-8931-5a8d-8fb5-c06108869c29.html. The draft 
regulations will be presented to the state’s Land Quality Advisory board on De-
cember 6, 2017, and then opened to the public for comment. Id. 
 162. OMB WATCH REGULATORY RESEARCH CTR., BACKGROUND ON THE 
RULEMAKING PROCESS 3, https://www.foreffectivegov.org/sites/default/files/ 
regs/rcenter/backgroundpdfs/IV.Rulemaking.pdf (“The time it takes from initial 
drafts of a regulation to publication as a final rule can range from a few months 
to several years. Most often, it takes a few years . . . because of the complexity 
of the issues, the collection of appropriate information, and the inherent delays 
built into the regulatory process.”). 
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industry.163 For interested parties like Petitioners, who seek a 
national change in self-bonding policy, they may want to circum-
vent OSMRE entirely.164 This would be a possible route if the 
federal rulemaking does not happen, or if the rulemaking pro-
duces an unsatisfactory result that does not make enough 
changes to strengthen financial review. Granted, it would be 
best to wait for a sympathetic Congress before seriously advanc-
ing any legislation, and that may take just as long as a federal 
rulemaking. However, there is already one bill proposed in Con-
gress that could provide the Petitioners’ desired result. 
The Coal Clean Up Taxpayer Protection Act would address 
the issue of ensuring reclamation on a national scale without in-
volving OSMRE.165 Senator Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.), ranking 
member of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Commit-
tee, spearheaded the Congressional anti-self-bonding campaign 
throughout 2016.166 In February 2016, she questioned then-In-
terior Secretary Sally Jewell about the dangers of self-bonding 
by coal companies during testimony regarding the Interior De-
partment’s budget request for the fiscal year of 2017.167 In March 
2016, Senator Cantwell and Senator Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) submit-
ted a request to the Government Accountability Office to inves-
tigate self-bonding by coal companies.168 Senator Cantwell also 
followed up on her questioning of Secretary Jewell by sending a 
letter asking for a plan to protect taxpayers and end self-bond-
ing.169 In June 2016, Senator Cantwell introduced the Coal 
 
 163. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 164. Cf. Baltz et al., supra note 157 (quoting a spokesman for the Indiana 
Department of Natural Resources as saying: “Self-bonding is not a policy. It’s 
law—both state and federal. Any change would have to come from one of those 
legislative bodies.”). 
 165. S. 3066, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 166. See Energy, MARIA CANTWELL: U.S. SEN. FOR WASH., https://www.cant-
well.senate.gov/issues/energy (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (giving a brief descrip-
tion of the Senator ’s efforts in this area). 
 167. Cantwell Questions Secretary Jewell on the Dangers of Self-Bonding by 
Coal Companies, U.S. S. COMM. ON ENERGY & NAT. RES. (Feb. 23, 2016), http:// 
www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/democratic-news?ID=92D91C29 
-5E05-40CA-B2D3-6AC6BCE17992. 
 168. Cantwell, Durbin to GAO: Investigate Self-Bonding by Coal Companies, 
U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY & NAT. RES. (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www 
.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/democratic-news?ID=F2BA9FD5-A60A 
-4575-AF22-C5C6E60119FF. 
 169. Cantwell Asks Interior Secretary Jewell for Plan To Protect Taxpayers 
and End Self-Bonding for Coal Mining Reclamation, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE 
ON ENERGY & NAT. RES. (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/ 
index.cfm/2016/3/cantwell-asks-interior-secretary-jewell-for-plan-to-protect 
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Clean Up Taxpayer Protection Act, which would amend SMCRA 
to disallow future self-bonding and require current self-bonds to 
be converted to surety or collateral bonds.170 When the Act did 
not pass, the senator reintroduced it in 2017.171 Since Senator 
Cantwell proposes an even more extreme solution to self-bond-
ing—ending the practice entirely—it is unlikely to acquire bipar-
tisan support in Congress. If someone proposed a bill that in-
cluded more compromising positions, like those recommended in 
Parts III.A and B, it may receive more support. This type of leg-
islative campaign is an example of a viable option that not only 
brings attention and momentum to the issue now, but could 
serve as an alternative means to the end, in the event that the 
federal rulemaking never happens or produces an unsatisfactory 
result. 
  CONCLUSION   
This Note describes how the market trend is shifting away 
from coal in the long term, causing numerous recent coal mining 
companies to go bankrupt and making future bankruptcies plau-
sible. Even though coal may never see the same production or 
consumption levels in the United States again, it cannot be 
phased out of the national economy immediately or easily. Coal 
will likely retain a central role in the U.S. energy economy for at 
least another decade.172 Therefore, it is necessary to address the 
problem of self-bonded mine companies before taxpayers are 
 
-taxpayers-and-end-self-bonding-for-coal-mining-reclamation. 
 170. Coal Cleanup Taxpayer Protection Act, S. 3066, 114th Cong. (2016) 
(read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 
June 6, 2016), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/3066. 
 171. Coal Cleanup Taxpayer Protection Act, S. 800, 115th Cong. (2017) (read 
twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Mar. 
30, 2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/800. 
 172. Even in states that have committed to phase out coal-fired power 
plants, the goal date is decades in the future. See, e.g., Mike Hughlett, State 
Regulators Approve Xcel’s Plan To Shut Down Becker Coal-Fired Plants, STAR 
TRIB. (Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.startribune.com/state-regulators-approve-xcel 
-s-plan-to-shut-down-becker-coal-fired-plants/397030671 (explaining that the 
coal-fired generators in Becker, Minnesota, will be shut down by 2026); Oregon 
Becomes First State in Nation To Sign Bill That Phases Out Coal, Ramps Up 
Renewables, ECOWATCH (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.ecowatch.com/oregon 
-becomes-first-state-in-nation-to-sign-bill-that-phases-out-coal-1882189350 
.html (“[The law] will eradicate the use of coal for electricity generation entirely 
within two decades.”); TVA Has Agreed To Phase Out Older Coal-Fired Plants 
by the Year 2020—and Phase in Cleaner, Greener Forms of Energy, TENN. VAL-
LEY AUTH., https://www.tva.gov/Environment/Environmental-Stewardship/ 
Air-Quality/Clean-Air-Act-Agreement (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). 
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forced to take on the burden of reclamation. This Note argues 
that the federal agency in charge of coal mining, OSMRE, should 
change the language of existing regulations to strengthen finan-
cial review and require diversification of financial assurances. 
This Note also encourages OSMRE to work closely with state 
agencies moving forward, as states have the primary enforce-
ment role under SMCRA and the most experience working with 
coal mine companies, including on the issue of self-bonding. 
Whether or not the rulemaking will proceed in the near future 
remains to be seen. If the rulemaking does not occur or does not 
correct the problems identified with self-bonding, Petitioners 
should consider the (admittedly difficult) path towards amend-
ing regulations through legislative efforts. For the sake of the 
land, the local communities, and the taxpayers, self-bonding rec-
lamation practices need to change. 
